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Brexit, Cabinet Norms and the Ministerial Code: are we living in a post- Nolan era? 
Leighton Andrews 
Abstract 
The Nolan Report will celebrate its 25th anniversary in 2020 and for most of this last quarter-
century has provided the underlying ethical basis for public life in the United Kingdom. 
However, its principles are now being called into question in a number of areas, following 
the Conservative government’s loss of its Parliamentary majority in the 2017 election, with 
the interests of party taking precedence over adherence to both the spirit and the codified 
practical implementation of some of the ultimate outcomes of Nolan, namely the Ministerial 
Code and the Commissioner for Parliamentary Standards. This article argues, with explicit 
evidence and examples, that ministerial conduct that would not have been tolerated before 
2017 is now being routinely ignored in the interest of maintaining party unity in order to 
deliver some form of Brexit. The article concludes by asking whether Nolan norms still 
command consensus post-Brexit. 
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Brexit, Cabinet Norms and the Ministerial Code: are we living in a post- Nolan era? 
 
Introduction 
It’s doubtful how many now remember John Major’s hope that the Nolan Committee would 
be an ‘ethical workshop’. The Committee on Standards in Public Life (CPSL) has become an 
integral institution within the Westminster machinery1. Its remit was expanded in 1997 by 
Tony Blair to look at party funding; it has taken on work in emerging areas of public concern, 
such as intimidation in public life and the use of artificial intelligence in the public sector. 
The Nolan principles have been widely adopted, including by the devolved administrations 
whose work is now technically outside the CPSL’s remit. The CPSL’s recommendations in 
respect of the working document, Questions of Procedure for Ministers, published only in 
1992 by John Major himself, led to its formalisation into the Ministerial Code - as it was re-
named by Tony Blair in 1997 - in addition to a Civil Service Code. Its recommendations in 
respect of Parliament, including the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, were 
debated and disputed by a wide range of former senior Conservative Parliamentarians 
including Enoch Powell and Edward Heath, before finally being adopted. Rules governing 
senior civil servants taking up business appointments were extended to ministers.   
The Ministerial Code is now a core document underpinning the U.K.’s unwritten 
constitution. Ministerial Codes for the devolved administrations draw on, and are largely 
based on, the U.K. Ministerial Code. Since 2011, the Ministerial Code has been 
supplemented at a U.K. level by The Cabinet Manual. Since the 2017 election, however, 
breaches of the Code, and of other norms codified by Nolan and his successors in the CPSL, 
have regularly occurred. Prior to the Brexit vote in 2016, these transgressions would have 
been accompanied by a public and media outcry which would have shortened the 
ministerial lives of those involved: post-2016 they have, in some cases, been tolerated. 
Explicitly, these issues relate to 
• Misleading Parliament 
• Business Appointments 
• Collective responsibility 
• Ministerial accountability 
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• Neutrality of the sovereign 
• Impartiality of the civil service  
• M.P.’s interests 
 
These are, of course, unstable and unprecedented political times in the U.K. The U.K. is 
divided and polarised over Brexit. 2018 saw a record number of ministerial resignations in a 
single year. The Government has been found in contempt of Parliament. It has suffered 
unprecedented defeats. It has allowed Opposition motions to go through with no 
Government votes against to disguise the scale of defeat. It has been accused of abusing 
voting procedures in the Commons and pairing arrangements.  It has suffered defections. Its 
performance in the recent European Parliament elections was its worst since 1832.  
 
Misleading Parliament 
The Ministerial Code is explicit about the duty of Ministers to give ‘accurate and truthful 
information to Parliament’. It says that Ministers who ‘knowingly mislead Parliament’ will be 
expected to offer their resignations to the Prime Minister. In the summer of 2018, Esther 
McVey, then the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, made a number of statements to 
Parliament in respect of the National Audit Office’s opinions of her department’s progress 
on implementing Universal Credit which were incorrect. In an unprecedented move, the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General wrote to her to correct three statements2. Following 
receipt of the letter, Ms McVey went before the House of Commons to apologise for 
‘inadvertently misleading’ the House. The Ministerial Code states that Ministers who 
discover ‘any inadvertent error’ must correct it ‘at the earliest opportunity’. Ms McVey’s 
apology was given swiftly following the receipt of the letter, enabling the Prime Minister to 
operate the letter of the Ministerial Code and keep Ms McVey in post, even if many felt that 
the tone of her apology, and her original statements, were a clear breach of spirit of the 
Code.  
 
McVey’s failure to resign then was a stark contrast to the example of the former Home 
Secretary, Amber Rudd, whose resignation letter stated that she was resigning because she 
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had ‘inadvertently misled’ the Commons Home Affairs Committee over targets for removing 
illegal immigrants. After Rudd’s resignation, an inquiry by former Ministry of Justice 
Permanent Secretary Sir Alex Allan was, in civil service terms at least, scathing about the 
civil service support given to the Home Secretary3.  
 
Why one act of inadvertent misleading should be punishable by resignation while another is 
not is unclear and certainly inconsistent. In Rudd’s case, it may be that the story had been 
running for too long and she had in effect ‘doubled down’ on her misleading statement. 
Whether the Amber Rudd experience determined the Prime Minister to be more forgiving  
in the case of Esther McVey is unclear. It is hard to escape the conclusion that in July 2018, 
on the eve of the Chequers Cabinet on the Withdrawal Agreement, Brexit pressures were 
more acute. (Rudd eventually returned to government as Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions in succession to McVey, seven months after the latter’s resignation over Brexit).   
 
 
Business Appointments 
 
Nolan recommended that, like senior civil servants, ministers who leave office should seek 
permission from the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA) before 
accepting and taking up a business role. In July 2018, within a week of resigning as Foreign 
Secretary, Boris Johnson signed a contract with the Daily Telegraph to write a weekly 
column. He did not apply to ACOBA for permission until two weeks after signing the 
contract. 
The Chair of ACOBA, Baroness Browning, wrote to Johnson on 8 August, saying: 
The committee considers it unacceptable that you signed a contract with the 
Telegraph and your appointment was announced before you had sought and 
obtained advice from the Committee, as was incumbent upon you on leaving office 
under the Government’s Business Appointment Rules. 
The letter pointed out that the rules were contained within the Ministerial Code and this 
was ‘a failure to comply with your duty’ to seek advice4. Johnson had been reminded in a 
 
5 
 
letter from his Permanent Secretary on leaving office of his duties. He claimed that he did 
not receive this letter before signing the contract. 
The Committee refused to grant retrospective advice, stating that Johnson’s actions were ‘a 
breach of the rules’. It said that it expected that his Telegraph contract would be amended 
to confirm that he would not make use of privileged information arising from his role as 
Foreign Secretary. 
In many eyes, Johnson’s abuse of the rules was accentuated by his refusal to leave the 
Foreign Secretary’s Carlton House residence for three weeks, despite warnings from the 
Permanent Secretary.  
 
 
Collective Responsibility 
Collective responsibility as such was not a subject which the original Nolan report addressed 
in detail, but the principle of collective responsibility is set out in the Ministerial Code. The 
Code explains that the principle is intended to allow Ministers to express their views freely 
in private but maintain ‘a united front’ once decisions are reached. This also requires that 
the opinions expressed by Ministers in in Cabinet, in Ministerial Committees, and in inter-
ministerial correspondence, should remain private. The Cabinet Manual reinforces this 
requirement to abide by decisions that have been reached and explains that it may on 
occasion be ’explicitly set aside’ with Ministers granted an ‘agreement to differ’.  
Following the Chequers Cabinet discussion on Brexit in July 2018, the Prime Minister wrote 
to Conservative M.P.s stating that collective responsibility, which had been suspended 
during the referendum in 2016, was now being ‘fully’ restored. Her argument was that she 
had ‘allowed cabinet colleagues to express their individual views’ while the policy was being 
developed.  That ‘fully’ has never been satisfactorily explained. The assumption had been 
that collective responsibility had only been ‘explicitly set aside’ for the period of the 
referendum in 2016 in the Minute from the then Prime Minister David Cameron issued in 
January 2016. Indeed, ‘special arrangements’ were put in place in late 2016 to allow 
Ministers who had obtained approval from the Prime Minister to set out their personal 
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opinions on plans for a third runway at Heathrow5. I can find no statement from Theresa 
May between her becoming Prime Minister in July 2016 and the Chequers Cabinet in July 
2018 that she had not fully restored collective responsibility. This appears to be a post hoc 
justification of two years of Cabinet dissent. 
While Cabinet disagreements had surfaced throughout the previous three years, with 
differing shades of aggression and detail, in the run up to the initial March 29 deadline for 
leaving the European Union, they broke out into the open again. Liam Fox criticised Amber 
Rudd, David Gauke and Greg Clark for being public about their intention to stop No-Deal. In 
March 2019 there appeared to be a complete breakdown of Cabinet discipline over a series 
of Brexit votes, with remain-voting Cabinet Ministers voted against the government line, 
abstaining on a motion ruling out No-Deal Brexit. Six pro-Brexit Cabinet Ministers voted for 
the so-called Malthouse compromise on the Irish back-stop. The Prime Minister’s PPS was 
alleged to be authorising the Remain Cabinet Ministers to vote against the government line 
– there was said op be ‘fury’ in the  Government Whips’ Office‘ 6. Meanwhile, though public 
exposure of Cabinet disagreements on spending restrictions is not new, the recent 
regularity might be, as a precursor to the 2019 Conservative leadership election, when 
candidates on all sides were to take issue with the still-incumbent Prime Minister and 
Chancellor over austerity. 
The principle that Cabinet discussions should happen in private has been breached on a 
regular basis. Boris Johnson, exceptionally, briefed his views on what the Brexit deal should 
be in an article in the Daily Telegraph in advance of a Cabinet meeting in September 2017, 
but there have been regular leaks from Cabinet, often detailed and precise as to the views 
of participants. In June 2018, the Prime Minister ‘berated’ Chief Secretary Liz Truss over her 
public criticisms of Michael Gove. Andrea Leadsom’s comments at the Chequers Cabinet 
meeting were leaked to The Times.  Just before her resignation from the Cabinet, Esther 
McVey was said to be ‘in meltdown’ at the critical five-hour Cabinet meeting on the Brexit 
deal, was shouted down by the Chief Whip, and had the Cabinet Manual statement on 
collective responsibility read to her by the Cabinet Secretary, while nine Cabinet members 
were said to have raised concerns.  The Prime Minister warned Cabinet members that too 
many leaks from Cabinet meetings were happening and they occurred too often – her 
statement was immediately leaked.  A further report said that the Chief Whip had stormed 
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out and the Prime Minister had gone ‘batshit’ at Cabinet Members for disloyalty. Cabinet 
Minutes were said to be reflecting concerns over the impact of the Brexit impasse on the 
Conservative party, as much as the government, in one leak in March 2019 – a leak which 
raises Ministerial Code questions in itself. A letter from Cabinet Secretary Sir Mark Sedwill 
warning of the dangers of a no-deal Brexit was leaked to the Daily Mail in April 2019. The 
Prime Minister rebuked Cabinet Ministers over breaches of collective responsibility at 
Cabinet in May 2019. A week later, on the eve of the European elections, a ‘mutinous 
meeting’ of the Cabinet forced the Prime Minister to drop compromise options with 
opposition led by Chris Grayling, Andrea Leadsom and Geoffrey Cox.  A confidential Cabinet 
note warning that Britain would not be ready for a no-Deal Brexit in October was leaked to 
the Financial Times in June 20197. It is, of course, impossible to rule out that leaks may have 
come from Number Ten in some cases. 
 
Ministerial accountability 
The Ministerial Code institutionalises the concept of ministerial accountability when it says 
that ‘The Minister in charge of a department is solely accountable to Parliament for the 
exercise of the powers on which the administration of that department depends’, and 
reminds ministers that they must comply with what Parliament has set down on ministerial 
responsibility and accountability. These issues are reinforced in the Cabinet Manual. In 
2017, three ministers – Michael Fallon, Damian Green and Priti Patel, resigned over 
ministerial code breaches of one form or another: in Green’s case after a formal 
investigation: in the other two cases, the resignations took place after additional 
information came to the attention of Number 10.  
 
However, other apparent breaches of the Ministerial Code, including the duty to avoid 
confusing Ministerial and political work, and to avoid using government facilities for party 
political purposes, or transparency over meetings with lobbying groups appear to have been 
ignored. So Steve Baker allegedly held undisclosed meetings with the ERG, and attended 
ERG meetings in the House of Commons while a Minister, while Boris Johnson hosted the 
launch of a ‘think-tank’, the institute for Free Trade, at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office8  
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Amber Rudd’s resignation over inaccurate answers to the Home Affairs Committee was a 
clear example of the principle of Ministerial Accountability in operation: Ministers are 
responsible for what happens in their departments, including mistakes by officials. But was 
she bound to go? In recent decades, Cabinet Secretaries have sought to make the definition 
of ministerial accountability more precise. Lord Hunt said in the 1980s ‘The concept that 
because somebody whom the Minister has never heard of, has made a mistake, means that 
the Minister should resign, is out of date, and rightly so9.’ During the Scott Inquiry, Sir Robin 
Butler argued controversially that Ministerial ‘accountability’ is ‘a constitutional burden that 
rests on the shoulders of Ministers and cannot be set aside’. He said that it did not 
necessarily ‘require blame to be accepted’. Instead, ‘a Minister should not be held to blame 
or required to accept personal criticism unless he (sic) has some personal responsibility for 
or some personal involvement in what has occurred’10. In practice, as David Butler argued, 
there had been few resignations where Ministers had taken the blame for actions by their 
officials, and rather more where Ministers had refused to resign ‘when their department has 
goofed’. A huge amount is left to Prime Ministerial discretion11.   
 
Chris Grayling provides a test case for this. The Institute for Government is a think-tank 
which is well-respected on all sides of politics throughout the U.K. It is not known for bluster 
or hyperbole. In March 2019 its senior researcher, Tom Sasse, wrote ‘The continued survival 
of Chris Grayling in government sets a dangerous precedent for the principle of ministerial 
accountability’. Grayling, said Sasse, had ‘presided over a series of botched projects and 
expensive failures during his eight years in office’. As he pointed out, the Twitter hashtag 
#failinggrayling was often seen. Grayling’s ministerial record, he said, was ‘abysmal’. But as 
the manager of Theresa May’s leadership campaign, he was untouchable. In the week of 
Sasse’s article The Times had written of Grayling in an editorial that ‘his ministerial 
incompetence has gone on for too long’. An article detailed his ‘many mishaps’. The 
Guardian said ‘Failing Grayling is not funny anymore’. It stated ‘it is Mr Grayling’s 
incompetence that makes him unfit for the high public office he now holds’. It is hard to 
avoid Sasse’s conclusion that Grayling remained because he was ‘a high profile Brexit-
backing minister in a divided Cabinet’12.  
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This is not to say that Theresa May was not prepared to sack people where the case is 
overwhelming. Her letter to Gavin Williamson stating ‘your conduct has not been of the 
same standard as others’;  there was ‘compelling evidence’ that he was behind the leak, 
that ‘no other, credible version of events’ could explain it, and that she could no longer 
‘have full confidence’ in him is, in the history of ministerial sackings, pretty brutal and 
emphatic13. But the Williamson case has proved an exception over the last two years.  
 
Neutrality of the sovereign 
Chapter One of The Cabinet Manual is called ‘The Sovereign’. It is an upfront statement that 
the U.K. is technically a constitutional monarchy. The Manual states in its Introduction: ‘The 
UK is a Parliamentary democracy which has a constitutional sovereign as Head of State’. It is 
widely understood that one of the reasons for drafting the Manual in the first place was that 
the closeness of the opinion polls in 2009 suggested that a hung parliament was possible, 
and in that case ‘the constitutional procedures to be followed’ should be ‘made clear and 
open’14. It is likely, though unstated, that there was a desire to clarify those procedures in 
order to ensure that, whatever choices she might be called upon to make in the context of a 
hung parliament, the Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics: as former Cabinet 
Secretary Gus O’Donnell said later ‘it is important that the Queen stays above politics’15. 
Changes were made to the Manual on whether there was a duty on the incumbent Prime 
Minister to stay in office until it was clear that a successor was obvious16. The current 
edition of the Cabinet Manual, in the chapter on ‘Elections and Government Formation’, 
clearly states 
 
In modern times the convention has been that the Sovereign should not be drawn 
into party politics, and if there is doubt it is the responsibility of those involved in the 
political process, and in particular the parties represented in Parliament, to seek to 
determine and communicate clearly to the Sovereign who is best placed to be able 
to command the confidence of the House of Commons. 
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Early in 2019, a comment by the Queen that politicians should ‘seek common ground’ – 
assumed to be a reference to Brexit - ‘while never losing sight of the bigger picture’ drew 
criticism from The Times: 
The success of the royal family has been based on the fact that the Queen has 
remained above the political fray. She would do well to stay there. 
The Guardian however saw the Queen’s comments as an illustration of the depth of the 
crisis to which the U.K. was headed as prominent Brexiteers suggested prorogation of 
Parliament, first aired by members of the European Research Group such as Jason Rees-
Mogg17. 
The Cabinet Manual makes clear the role of the Sovereign in the Prorogation of Parliament: 
Parliament may be prorogued before being dissolved or may just adjourn. It has not 
been modern practice for Parliament to be dissolved while sitting. Prorogation brings 
a Parliamentary session to an end. It is the Sovereign who prorogues Parliament on 
the advice of his or her ministers. 
These issues obviously have an added salience today. The idea that Parliament might be 
prorogued to enable a no deal Brexit was advocated by Conservative leadership candidates. 
Since the Sovereign had to prorogue Parliament it would inevitably bring the Queen into a 
controversy that has divided the people of the U.K., threatens the Union and affects 
relationships with neighbouring states. The Cabinet Secretary publicly warned Conservative 
leadership candidates about this in a lecture at the Institute for Government in June. 18 
Yet, in mid-August, the new Prime Minister determined to seek the prorogation of 
Parliament - though he denied that was his plan later in the month - before finally 
despatching the Leader of the House of Commons to Balmoral to seek the Queen’s 
agreement. Parliament was prorogued amid disorderly scenes in September. Following 
court action in Scotland and England, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously on 24 
September 24 that the prorogation was unlawful, stating ‘it is impossible for us to conclude, 
on the evidence which has been put before us, that there was any reason—let alone a good 
reason—to advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for five weeks’. When Parliament sat 
again on 25 September, the Speaker confirmed that ‘the item relating to the Prorogation of 
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Parliament in the Journal of Monday 9 September’ would be ‘expunged’ and the House 
would instead be recorded as ‘adjourned’ at the close of the business.19 
 
 
Impartiality of the Civil Service 
In early 2018, the then Brexit Minister, Steve Baker, was forced to apologise to the House of 
Commons after criticising Treasury officials over their forecasts of the impact of Brexit. The 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Liz Truss, explicitly attacked the bureaucratic machine as  
‘gremlins of government’ in June 2018. In October 2018, the then acting Cabinet Secretary 
Sir Mark Sedwill wrote to The Times defending the impartiality of the civil service following a 
series of anonymous attacks on civil servants over both the Brexit negotiations and Brexit 
implementation. Sedwill said that ‘sniping’ by ‘anonymous sources’ had to stop. He stated 
bluntly that ‘civil servants have always trusted that our fellow citizens, whatever their views, 
know that we are doing our duty to implement the decisions of the government they elect’. 
ITV’s political editor Robert Peston saw this as an ‘incendiary’ intervention: ‘the most 
powerful civil servant in the UK is saying that if you don’t like the government’s Brexit 
policy, stop blaming civil servants – blame @Theresa_may and her ministers’20.    
The Ministerial Code places a responsibility on all ministers ‘to uphold the impartiality of the 
civil service’. They should be professional in their dealings with the civil service and give due 
weight and respect to the advice that they are given. These issues are again reinforced in 
the Cabinet Manual. Despite Mark Sedwill’s defence, repeated in April 2019, anonymous 
and on-the-record criticisms of civil servants continue. Some of these certainly derive from 
ministers and/or their special advisers. The leader of the First Division Association, Dave 
Penman wrote in July 2019, ‘these selective leaks are increasingly becoming the modus 
operandi of a number of politicians (or, more frequently, those around them, to provide 
that all-important plausible deniability).’ Penman also attacked opposition politicians, 
though anonymous civil servants quoted as doubting Jeremy Corbyn’s health did their cause 
no favours21. 
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Penman’s remarks came in the aftermath of the resignation of the U.K. Ambassador to the 
United States, Sir Kim Darroch, after his confidential comments on the U.S. President were 
leaked to British newspapers. Darroch resigned after the refusal of the successful 
Conservative leadership candidate, Boris Johnson, to endorse him during one of the 
leadership debates. The former U.S. ambassador to the European Union, Anthony Gardner, 
tweeted     
We are truly living during a religious war. Decency goes out the window and there is 
no sense of outrage. 
Meanwhile, reports have multiplied about civil service departures and a decline in morale22. 
Senior civil servants can protect themselves against what they regard as inappropriate 
ministerial behaviour: the Permanent Secretary can ask for a written ministerial direction 
for a specified course of action. Since the 2016 referendum these have run into double 
figures, although analysis by the Institute for Government suggests that the number is not 
unprecedented, with 2009 seeing the highest number of directions issued, and a more 
secretive approach taken before 201123. 
MP’s Interests 
If we return to the issue that originally brought Nolan into being, the remuneration of M.P.s 
and their declarations of interest, one story should be enough to illustrate the end of the 
Nolan consensus. In December 2018, Boris Johnson was told by the Commons Standards 
Committee to apologise for his ‘over-casual’ failure to declare £52,000 worth of expenses in 
an incident which the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards said was ‘a lack of 
attention to House requirements, rather than inadvertent error’. Despite this, ten years 
after the Commons expenses scandal, Mr Johnson, won the Conservative leadership and 
became Prime Minister24. 
Conclusion 
The Nolan era is over. Ministers can perform badly but not be sacked. They can mislead 
Parliament but escape punishment. Cabinet and other ministers can breach collective 
responsibility with impunity. Details of Cabinet meetings and indeed Cabinet minutes can be 
leaked without any sanction. Ministers can undermine civil servants without consequence to 
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themselves. Ex-Ministers can ignore ACOBA rules and a year later become Prime Minister. 
Ministers sacked for leaking can rejoin the Cabinet within months. 
Meanwhile, the Ministerial Code has been re-written with a Foreword by the Prime Minister 
which after an exhortation to make the UK ‘the greatest place on earth’ restates Nolan 
principles and despite the prior behaviour of many of his Cabinet states  
 There must be no bullying and no harassment; no leaking; no breach of 
collective responsibility. No misuse of taxpayer money and no actual or 
perceived conflicts of interest. 
The Foreword then makes clear the primary objective of the Cabinet: 
 Crucially, there must be no delay - and no misuse of process or procedure by 
any individual Minister that would seek to stall the collective decisions 
necessary to deliver Brexit and secure the wider changes needed across our 
United Kingdom25. 
In the so-called ‘post-truth’ world, academic research tells us that crises of legitimacy create 
space for demagogues to cast themselves as authentic speakers of truth to power, and give 
partisan or aggrieved publics cover to forgive breaches of norms that formerly would have 
been condemned26. Nolan depended on a shared political consensus about the norms which 
underpin standards in public life. That consensus depended on peer endorsement within 
Westminster, and peer pressure to uphold agreed standards; on a media that endorsed 
those standards and ways of operating, and refused to downplay breaches of norms simply 
because the politician affected shared their views on a particular issue; and it probably also 
depended on a public which had not yet reached the state of cynicism about 
parliamentarians that the 2009 expenses scandal produced. In the U.K. today, attitudes to 
Brexit determine attitudes to political norms. We live in a ‘post-shame’ world, Alastair 
Campbell has said27.  
The historian Sir Anthony Seldon recently wrote of the need for a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and a Constitutional Convention to re-unite the country post-Brexit: this would 
also require statesmanship. Nolan, described by Peter Hennessy as ‘a miniature, if informal, 
constitutional convention’28 was a model for a different world. Truth and Reconciliation, a 
constitutional convention, statesmanship, a new Nolan: all depend now on the new Prime 
Minister. But is it likely that the necessary statesmanship will be shown by someone whose 
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track record of breaking rules on business appointments or reporting of financial interests 
suggests they regard these as matters for people other than themselves?  
On 20 September, the chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life wrote an open 
letter to all public office holders on the importance of upholding public standards. In it he 
said that ‘leadership of standards must come from the top’. He warned it was vital that: 
the tone of public debate should avoid abuse and intimidation, which have become 
increasingly widespread. Parliamentary democracy is under threat if those in public 
life and public office cannot express their views freely and without fear. 
Five days later, the Prime Minister, on his return to the re-opened House of Commons, 
accused the Opposition of ‘political selfishness and political cowardice’, saying that they 
wanted to betray the people in support of the Benn-Burt ‘surrender act’. He repeated the 
surrender act rhetoric on several occasions29. 
We live in a post-Nolan age, and the new Prime Minister is its embodiment. 
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